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Abstract Studies of small and medium-sized enterprises have provided evidence
that CEOs of such firms can have a dominating influence on firm activities. Drawing
on upper echelons theory, we analyze the influence of CEO personality (CEO internal
locus of control), CEO ownership and CEO education on the evaluation of middle
manager performance. In line with our expectations, we find evidence for a direct
effect of CEO ownership (negative) and CEO education (positive) on the use of
objective performance evaluations and for a direct effect of the CEO’s internal locus
of control on the use of subjective performance evaluations. Moreover, we provide
evidence for a moderating role of both CEO ownership and education with respect
to the influence of the CEO’s locus of control on the use of subjective evaluations.
We use a sample of 247 small and medium-sized manufacturing firms to test our
hypotheses.
Keywords Small and medium-sized Enterprises · CEO personality · Performance
evaluations
JEL Classification M12
1 Introduction
The CEO has the primary responsibility for defining a firm’s strategic directions
and goals as well as for guiding and regulating the actions of middle and lower
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level managers who execute firm strategy (e. g. Calori et al. 1994). The powerful,
sometimes even dominating influence of CEOs on firm activities (particularly in
relatively small firms) has prompted enormous interest in the impact of CEO per-
sonality on strategic behaviors and the study of CEO personality has emerged as
an important topic in management research (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007; Chin
et al. 2013; Crossland et al. 2014; Herrmann and Nadkarni 2014; Hiller and Ham-
brick 2005). Most existing studies in upper echelons research have focused on the
influence of CEO personality characteristics on a firm’s strategic choices (Carpenter
et al. 2004; Hambrick 2007), while their long proposed influence on a firm’s major
administrative choices (see Hambrick and Mason 1984, p. 195) has received less
attention. Recently, an emerging literature in accounting research has suggested an
influence of managers’ personal caracteristics on their accounting decisions (e. g.
Bamber et al. 2010; Ge et al. 2011). However, among these studies only very few
focus on management control system (MCS) choices and “theoretical insights and
empirical findings about the relevance of top executives in designing, perceiving and
using MCS are still rare” (Schaeffer and Dossi 2014, p. 219).
Hiebl’s (2014) recent review of upper echelons theory in management account-
ing and control research includes only three studies with regard to the relationship
between CEO characteristics and management accounting choices (these are: Aber-
nethy et al. 2010; Burkert and Lueg 2013, and Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann 2007).
Abernethy et al. (2010, p. 3) motivate their study claiming that it is also “the be-
havioral tendencies and personal traits associated with a leader that influence how
they use controls to influence the behavior of subordinates”. However, the study
itself does not refer to trait theories of leadership but rather analyzes how a leader’s
leadership behaviors (initiating structure vs. considerate leadership) are associated
with the way how this leader controls subordinates. Rather than measuring lead-
ers’ personality characteristics and traits, Abernethy et al. (2010, p. 4) argue that
“Leadership style captures cognitive or personality characteristics of managers”. Ac-
cording to the existing literature on leadership, the association between personality
characteristics (leader traits) and leadership styles (i. e. leader behaviors), however,
is unclear and this literature has even treated leader traits and behaviors as indepen-
dent variables to explain leader effectiveness.1 Thus, the study by Abernethy et al.
(2010) can only speculate about the association between leader personality charac-
teristics and Management Control choices. The other two studies focus on so-called
observable CEO characteristics. Upper echelons research has interpreted observable
CEO characteristics (such as age, tenure, functional background or education) as
proxies for “psychological constructs” that directly measure aspects of personality
(but are much more difficult to obtain, see Carpenter et al. 2004). While Burkert
and Lueg (2013) do not find a significant impact of CEO characteristics on value-
based management systems, Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann (2007) compare hospitals
with CEOs having a business-related education background versus a more clinical
background and they find that the former make more use of financial information,
use control systems more diagnostically and put greater emphasis on performance
1 On behavioral vs. trait theories of leadership and possible associations between the two, see e. g. Derue,
Nahrgang, Wellman and Humphrey (2011).
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evaluation while the latter focus more on non-financial information and use control
systems more interactively.
Observable CEO characteristics have also been used to explain the particular
characteristics of small and family businesses – without explicitly using an upper
echelons theory perspective, however. This literature has pointed at CEO ownership
(the CEO not only leads the firm but also owns firm shares) and CEO education
as two characteristics to influence the administrative choices of small and medium-
sized firms (see Daily and Dollinger 1992; Hiebl et al. 2015; Lavia López and Hiebl
2015; Speckbacher and Wentges 2012). We build on this literature and analyze how
CEO ownership and education are associated with the evaluation of middle manager
performance.
The main contribution of this paper, however, focuses on a psychological con-
struct, the CEO’s internal locus of control, to explain variation in the use of sub-
jective performance evaluations. Psychological constructs have rarely been used so
far in management control research and the studies that employ such constructs use
them to explain variation in employees’ reaction to control systems rather than ex-
plaining their possible impact on the choices of those who design control systems.
For example, a recent paper by Young, Du, Dworkis and Olsen (2016) investigates
how employee narcissism impacts the effectiveness of control systems. Two classi-
cal studies by Brownell (1981, 1982) find that the locus of control of subordinates
determines the effects of budgetary participation.
In upper echelons research, CEO locus of control has become a main psycholog-
ical construct besides CEO narcissism and CEO core self-evaluation (see Herrmann
and Nadkarni 2014; key examples of such studies are Boone et al. 1996; Miller et al.
1982).
We believe that the CEO’s internal locus of control is particularly interesting for
explaining control choices in small and medium-sized firms, since there is broad ev-
idence that small and mediums-sized firms are often dominated by an “omnipresent”
CEO, who tries to keep the whole firm under his/her control, exerting an immedi-
ate influence on strategy development as well as on strategy implementation (Harris
et al. 1994; Mintzberg and Waters 1982; Ward 1988). In its original interpretation by
Rotter (1954), the “internal locus of control” (iLOC) construct measures the extent
to which individuals believe to be in control over their life situation and to what
degree they trust in their own capacity to influence their environment. According to
Lied and Pritchard (1976) and Phares (1976) this construct measures how confident
individuals are about their own ability to assess and to influence others’ behavior.
Since subjective performance evaluations, i. e. the use of personal judgments and
assessments to evaluate subordinates’ overall conduct, are by definition subjective
assessments of others’ behaviour with the purpose of influencing this behaviour, it
seems reasonable that the internal locus of control can contribute to explaining the
use of such evaluations. Research in psychology supports the notion that a rater’s
psychological characteristics might influence the use of subjective ratings. In fact,
previous research in psychology has found that a rater’s conscientionsness and agree-
ableness influence the biases in subjective ratings of performance (Bernardin et al.
2000; Goldberg 1992), without, however, analyzing the influence of the rater’s locus
of control on the use of such subjective ratings.
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In the following, we theorize on how a CEO’s personal characteristics are as-
sociated with his/her use of objective and subjective performance evaluations. In
line with findings from previous literature, we propose that CEO ownership and
education contribute to explaining variation in the use of objective performance
evaluations. With respect to the use of subjective performance evaluations, our theo-
retical deliberations on the the internal locus of control construct lead us to propose
a direct effect of the CEO’s iLOC on the use of SPE and a role of both CEO
ownership and CEO education in moderating this relationship.
2 Hypothesis Development
2.1 CEO Characteristics And The Use Of OPE
We know from prior contingency-based management accounting research (Chenhall
2003; Hall 2016) that the operating context of organizations influences the extent
to which pre-defined financial and nonfinancial measures such as revenues, profit or
customer satisfaction are used for performance evaluation (objective performance
evaluations, OPE). According to this research, OPE are used to greater extent, when
outcomes are easily measured, tasks are less programmable and when firm size
increases (Chenhall 2003).
Beyond these long-discussed organizational contingencies, small business and
family firm literature (Daily and Dollinger 1992; Hiebl et al. 2015; Lavia López and
Hiebl 2015; Speckbacher and Wentges 2012) has pointed at CEO firm ownership
and CEO education as two CEO-related characteristics that influence administrative
choices in relatively small firms. According to Daily and Dollinger (1992), the
separation of ownership and management implies that owners are absent from daily
business and these “outside” owners “will insist on the use of formal measures in
order to protect their investments” (Daily and Dollinger 1992, p. 124). Therefore,
CEOs who are no firm-owners (separation of ownership and control) are likely
to experience a higher pressure to justify their actions towards owners and to use
more formalized measures and performance evaluation practices. Since the use of
predefined financial and nonfinancial performance measures for the evaluation of
middle-manager performance can be interpreted as a “formal mode of management”
that signals professionalism to owners (see Speckbacher and Wentges 2012, p. 43),
non-owner CEOs are expected to make more use of such formal evaluation practices.
H1a. CEOs who are owners of the company make less use of objective perfor-
mance evaluations.
According to a common line of argument in the literature on small and medium-
sized enterprises, CEOs in smaller firms tend to show a lack of professionalism, i. e.
a lack of knowledge of established practices such as OPE practices (see e. g. Daily
and Dollinger 1992; Speckbacher and Wentges 2012). In particular, the combined
use of financial and nonfinancial performance measures in performance evaluation
has become a widely proposed (best) practice but even many large firms seem to
have difficulty in implementing such performance management systems (see e. g.
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Fig. 1 Structure of the hypothesized relationships H1ab
Speckbacher et al. 2003). Upper echelons theory has argued that firms whose top
managers have a higher level of education and management training might be “more
complex administratively” (Hambrick and Mason 1984, p. 201).
Therefore, it seems reasonable that CEOs with lower education will be more
likely to abstain from using objective performance evaluation practices that include
both financial and nonfinancial performance indicators (OPE) (Fig. 1).
H1b. CEOs with higher education make more use of objective performance eval-
uations.
2.2 CEO Characteristics And The Use Of SPE
While objective performance evaluations are based on formal pre-defined measures,
subjective performance evaluations are more ambiguously structured. When apply-
ing subjective performance evaluations, it is relatively ambiguous which (qualitative)
criteria are to be used and how assessments can be made. In contrast to objective
performance evaluations which rely solely on ex-ante defined indicators, subjective
performance evaluations are based on the manager’s personal impressions, feelings
and opinions (Bol 2008; Gibbs et al. 2004) and subjective performance measures
are a “superior’s subjective judgments about qualitative performance indicators”
(Moers 2005, p. 68). According to Bol (2008, p. 2), subjectivity “entails judgment
based on personal impressions, feelings, and opinions, rather than on external facts”.
Typically, subjective evaluations refer to performance dimensions that are not di-
rectly related to the task and, therefore, subjective evaluations have been specified
as “assessments of non-task-related performance” (Grabner and Speckbacher 2016).
In contrast to objective performance evaluations, subjective assessments allow the
evaluator to exploit and incorporate any information that arises during the mea-
surement period if this information seems relevant for the assessment (Gibbs et al.
2004). Moreover, subjective assessments allow the evaluator to incorporate difficult-
to-measure dimensions. In situations that are ambiguously structured, personality
can be expected to have a relatively strong influence on behaviour (Cooper and
Withey 2009; Mischel 1977). In line with this argumentation, subjective perfor-
mance assessments (in contrast to more clearly structured and formalized objective
performance evaluations) have been argued to be more influenced by psychology-
based factors than by “economic facts” (Ittner et al. 2003).
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The “internal locus of control” (iLOC) construct measures to what extent indi-
viduals believe to be in control over their life situation and to what degree they
trust in their own capacity to influence their environment (Rotter 1954). According
to Lied and Pritchard (1976) and Phares (1976), the iLOC construct is considered
a measure of individuals’ confidence in their own ability to assess and to influence
others’ behavior. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that CEOs with a high
iLOC are more likely to make use of subjective performance assessments in order
to regulate subordinate behavior. Furthermore, it has been proposed that individu-
als with a relatively high iLOC tend to show a more extensive information-search
behavior (Srinivasan and Tikoo 1992), they tend to consider more diverse informa-
tion in complex task situations (Spector 1982, p. 488), and it has been argued that
CEOs with a more internal locus of control show higher openness to new methods
of service and production (Miller et al. 1982). Using qualitative subjective mea-
sures in performance assessments can be interpreted as an attempt to incorporate
more indicators that cannot be readily measured, such as team-working abilities or
loyalty, into performance assessments (Bol 2008; Gibbs et al. 2004). As subjective
performance evaluations hand over power to the evaluators (Prendergast 1993), they
also support the disposition of “high iLOC individuals” to have things under their
own control (Phares 1976).
Overall, we hypothesize that a higher iLOC of CEOs will be associated with
a more intensive use of subjective evaluations of middle manager performance.
H2a. CEOs with a more pronounced internal LOC make more use of subjective
performance evaluations.
Literature on small and medium-sized firms has argued for a long time that
CEOs who also hold firm shares (owner CEOs) have more discretion to put forward
their own ideas and plans and that they have a more direct influence on strategy
development and implementation than (professional) outside managers (Harris et al.
1994; Mintzberg and Waters 1982; Ward 1988). In fact, upper echelons theory
has pointed to equity ownership as an aspect of “managerial discretion” which is
argued to intensify the influence of executives’ psychological characteristics on their
strategic and administrative decisions (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick and Finkelstein
1987; Finkelstein et al. 2009; Finkelstein and Peteraf 2007). For CEOs with a dual
role as managers and owners personal characteristics can thus be expected to have
a stronger influence on control system design (see also Hiebl 2014, p. 235).
Thus, we expect the positive relationship between the CEO’s internal LOC and
the use of subjective performance evaluations to be stronger for firms where CEOs
are equity owners than for firms with professional outside CEOs who do not possess
firm shares.
H2b. The association between the CEO’s internal LOC and the use of subjective
performance evaluations is stronger when CEOs are firm owners.
Individuals’ level of education is associated with their cognitive styles, their ways
of thinking, and their self-control (e. g. Mitchell 2000; Sassi et al. 2009). Upper ech-
elons research has used the level of education as a main observable upper echelon
characteristic that predicts executive strategic behavior (e. g. Hambrick and Mason
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1984). In particular, it has been argued that executives’ education level affects the
comprehensiveness of decision-making processes (see Papadakis and Barwise 2002,
Carpenter et al. 2004). A higher level of education can be interpreted as a “regulat-
ing mechanism” which leads individuals to invest more time into information search
activities and more comprehensive decision-making processes, leaving aside affecta-
tions and personal views in decision-making. In fact, existing evidence suggests that
CEO education level might attenuate the influence of psychological characteristics
such as iLOC on strategic orientations and behaviors (Okhomina 2010a, 2010b).
Similarly, a higher education level may attenuate the influence of the CEO’s iLOC
on the use of subjective performance evaluations.
Moreover, education can influence a person’s perception of a task’s difficulty
and complexity. Hambrick, Finkelstein and Mooney (2005) build on organization
behavior and organization psychology research (e. g. Janssen 2001; Karasek 1979)
and they define executive job demands “as the degree to which a given executive
experiences his or her job as difficult or challenging” (Hambrick et al. 2005, p. 473).
For a given task, executives might have differing perceptions on task demands.
In general, less educated and trained CEOs may perceive a given job as more
demanding than CEOs with better training and education. Since “executives who
are under great job demands take mental shortcuts and engage in limited search to
arrive at their choices” (Hambrick et al. 2005, p. 478), higher perceived demands
imply a stronger influence of executive personal characteristics on their choices
(see also Hiebl 2014, . 237). This line of reasoning thus further supports the above
expectation of a stronger influence of the CEO’s iLOC as a psychological CEO
characteristic on the decision to use subjective performance evaluations.
Overall, we hypothesize that for CEOs with higher education (university degree)
the relationship between the CEO’s internal locus of control and the use of subjective
performance evaluations will be weaker (Fig. 2).
H2c. The association between the CEO’s internal LOC and the use of subjective
performance evaluations is weaker for CEOs with higher education.
Fig. 2 Structure of the hypothesized relationships H2abc
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3 Methods And Data
3.1 Data Collection
An online questionnaire was sent to the CEOs of 1.026 manufacturing companies in
Austria with more than 50 but less than 250 employees according to the Amadeus
database. The mail addresses of the CEOs were hand-collected by scanning the
homepages of firms. Our first email was followed up by two reminder emails,
leaving us with a final total of 247 usable questionnaires (24% response rate). In
an accompanying letter and in the questionnaire itself we stressed repeatedly that
the survey had to be answered only by the CEO personally and no other person
within the company should answer it. CEOs answered questions on the psychological
variables (the CEO’s internal locus of control) as well as questions about their use
of mechanisms for evaluating middle manager performance and about other firm-
related variables.
Wherever possible, our survey questions are based on established measures. If
there was only an English version of the original construct available, it was translated
into German (the whole process was monitored by a language expert).
Since it is difficult to obtain reliable data from relatively small firms who are
often unwilling to disclose information on firm characteristics (e. g. Handler 1989)
and since our questionnaire also contained various (very personal) questions on
the CEO’s psychological characteristics, we relied on an extensive pretest with five
CEOs of relatively small firms and three consultants who specialize in projects with
small and medium-sized enterprises. Based on their comments we slightly reworded
several questions and we decided to condense our questionnaire by eliminating ques-
tions to increase the likelihood of a satisfactory response rate. For those (control)
variables where our interviews during the pretest verified that CEOs and experts
(consultants) easily understood the underlying questions and shared our interpreta-
tions and understanding of the formulations, we decided to rely on reduced or even
single-item scales.
As pointed out by previous research (e. g. Speckbacher and Wentges 2012), data
from the Amadeus Database is not always reliable with respect to employee numbers
and, therefore, we included a question on employee numbers in our questionnaire.
Where we noticed major deviations, we double-checked for the correct numbers
from available sources (webpages) or contacted firms to find out the correct numbers.
Because of several fast growing firms, the actual number of employees in several
cases was much higher than reported in the Database.
We checked the likelihood of non-response bias by comparing early to late re-
spondents using study variables as suggested by Armstrong and Overton (1977) and
found no significant mean differences between early and late respondents except
for one item within our Locus of Control construct.2 In addition, we gathered in-
2 The item is “Whether or not I have a car accident depends mainly on my driving talent”. We recalculated
all the regression analyses excluding this item from the respective construct. These analyses showed the
same results with only slight changes with respect to the p-values (iLOC significant at p = 0.021 instead of
p = 0.08).
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formation on firm characteristics, e. g. employee numbers or number of recorded
shareholders, for all firms in our initial sample. We compared such data from non-
respondents with the data provided by respondents, as recommended, for example,
by Celly and Frazier (1996), and, again, uncovered no significant differences. To
avoid common method bias, we framed our research project in a neutral way (“cover
story”) to psychologically separate the formulations of personality items from the
management control items (use of objective/subjective evaluations) as our depen-
dent variable. To check for possible common method bias, we employed Harman’s
single-factor test (Podsakoff et al. 2003) and did not find any indication of such
bias. Moreover, we checked for multicollinearity and discovered no indication of
multicollinearity issues.
For the list of employed constructs please see the appendix.
3.2 Measurement Of Variables
3.2.1 CEO Characteristics
The main CEO psychological characteristic “internal locus of control” (iLOC) was
measured using the German version of the internality scale of Levenson (1972),
which is a reconceptualization of Rotter’s (1954) original locus of control measure,
translated by Krampen (1980). Levenson’s version avoids problems of Rotter’s scale
such as social desirability bias and the forced-choice response setting, where external
and internal control expectancies were strictly distinguished (Lefcourt 1991 cited in
Judge et al. 1999; Krampen 1980; Hodkinson 1992). In all items, the first person
was used in order to stress the reference to the CEO as our target respondent.
Items include, for instance, “When I have plans I am sure that the planned will be
turned into reality” and “I am able to determine a lot of what happens in my life
by myself”. The scale has been used by other researchers such as Taylor (2010),
Hoffman, Novak, Schlosser (2003), Judge et al. (1999) and Waldersee and Sheather
(1996). Our pretest indicated severe concerns with three items of the original scale
in terms of suitability for CEOs and these items were therefore excluded from the
final questionnaire. Hence, in total, five items from the original scale were used.
The relatively low Cronbach’s alpha (0.625) is not uncommon for psychological
constructs of this type and similar to the Cronbach’s alpha of 0.66 for this construct
reported by Judge et al. (1999).
CEOs were also asked whether they passed through higher education (EDUCA-
TION) which we measured as a dummy variable that has the value of 1 when the
CEO has a University degree and the value of 0 otherwise.3
Also for measuring whether the CEO possesses firm shares (OWNER) we used
a dummy variable with the value 1 when the CEO owns firm shares and 0 where
the CEO does not own shares.
3 Other studies in management accounting research have used more specific aspects of the educational
background (e. g., Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2007; Burkert and Lueg, 2013).
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3.2.2 Subjective and Objective Performance Evaluations
The CEOs were asked to what extent certain statements are appropriate concerning
their application of subjective or objective performance evaluations when evaluating
the performance of middle managers. The formulation of items can be found in
the appendix. The measurement instruments used have been previously employed
in similar form, for example, by Grabner (2014), Grabner and Speckbacher (2016)
and Hartmann, Naranjo-Gil and Perego (2010).
3.2.3 Control Variables
Since there is persuasive evidence that company size, environmental uncertainty,
output measurability and task programmability are organizational contingencies that
influence performance measurements practices (see e. g. Chenhall 2003), we added
these four variables as control variables. Company size is measured by the number
of employees (COMPANY SIZE).
For environmental uncertainty we use a perceptual measure (ENVIRON. UN-
CERTAINTY) proposed by Moers (2006). Our measures of outcome measura-
bility (OUTCOME MEASURABILITY) and task programmability (TASK PRO-
GRAMMABILITY) rely on Snell (1992). Also a firm’s strategic focus on cost
leadership has been argued to be a possible influencing factor of performance mea-
surement and we drew on Auzair and Langfield-Smith (2005) and Chenhall and
Langfield-Smith (1998) to measure the firm’s strategic focus on cost leadership
(STRATEGY). The formulation of items can be found in the appendix.
Moreover, we asked for the age of the company (AGE COMPANY) (for its
possible influence on performance measurement see e. g. Chenhall 2003). CEOs
were also asked for their tenure (measured by the number of years) with the current
position (TENURE) as well as whether or not they are founders of the company
(FOUNDER).
Detailed results on factor analyses and on the Cronbach’s alphas can be found in
the appendix. Table 1 shows the correlations of variables.
4 Results
Table 2 shows that CEO ownership and education significantly influence the use of
OPE. Where the CEO is also owner of equity shares, OPEs are used to a lesser extent.
CEOs with a university degree use OPEs more intensively. Thus, hypotheses 1a (β =
–0.19, p = 0.003) as well as 1b (β = 0.19, p = 0.001) are supported.
It is worth mentioning that the CEO’s iLOC does not influence the use of OPEs.
This supports our argumentation that the influence of psychological CEO charac-
teristics is relevant for ambiguously structured control mechanisms while such an
influence is not expected for formalized and more clearly structured control mech-
anisms such as OPE.
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Table 2 Results of regression analysis: Objective performance evaluation
Dependent variable: Objective performance evaluation
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2
Company Size 0.20** (0.10) 0.001 0.14* (0.09) 0.012
Age Company 0.04 (0.00) 0.539 0.04 (0.00) 0.481
Environ. Uncertainty –0.13* (0.08) 0.024 –0.08 (0.08) 0.139
Outcome Measurability 0.33*** (0.05) 0.000 0.31*** (0.04) 0.000
Task Programmability 0.03 (0.06) 0.622 0.03 (0.05) 0.613
Strategy 0.18** (0.07) 0.001 0.20*** (0.07) 0.000
Tenure – –0.02 (0.01) 0.757
Founder – 0.02 (0.23) 0.696
Owner – –0.19** (0.18) 0.003
Education – 0.19** (0.16) 0.001
iLOC – 0.03 (0.09) 0.550
F-value 13.606***0.000 10.180***0.000
R2 0.25 0.32
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.29
n = 247, β coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-value estimates in italics
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, two-tailed tests
As predicted by standard contingency theory, company size and outcome mea-
surability have a positive influence on the use of OPE. Moreover, as expected, firms
with a strategic focus on cost leadership make more use of OPE.
Table 3 provides evidence that Hypothesis 2a is supported (β = 0.17, p = 0.008),
i. e. the CEO’s iLOC is associated with a more intense use of subjective performance
evaluations. Also CEO tenure is positively associated with the extent to which SPEs
are used (β = 0.14, p = 0.058).
Model 2 in Table 3 includes the two moderator terms. Both education (β = –0.67,
p = 0.048) and ownership (β = 0.61, p = 0.073) seem to moderate the underlying
relationship, albeit in different directions, thus providing support for hypotheses 2b
and 2c.
5 Discussion
Literature on small and medium-sized firms has argued that such firms are often
dominated by an “omnipresent” CEO, who keeps the whole firm under his/her
control (Harris et al. 1994; Mintzberg and Waters 1982; Ward 1988). We contribute
to a better understanding of the role of CEO personality in small and medium-
sized enterprises by focusing on a psychological characteristic of CEO personality,
the internal locus of control (iLOC). The iLOC construct is a measure for the
extent to which individuals believe to be in control over their fates and over their
environment and how confident individuals are about their own ability to assess
and to influence others’ behavior (Rotter 1954; Lied and Pritchard 1976; Phares
1976). In line with our expectation, our empirical results show that a pronounced
iLOC of CEOs in fact is associated with more use of informal judgments about
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Table 3 Results of regression analysis: Subjective performance evaluation
Dependent variable: Subjective performance evaluation
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Comparison
Company Size –0.09 (0.09)
0.174
–0.10 (0.09)
0.132
–0.10 (0.09)
0.121
–
Age Company 0.00 (0.00)
0.986
–0.03 (0.00)
0.672
–0.03 (0.00)
0.574
Environ. Uncertainty –0.20**
(0.07) 0.002
–0.19** (0.07)
0.003
–0.19** (0.07)
0.002
Outcome Measurability –0.13+ (0.04)
0.074
–0.14+ (0.04)
0.058
–0.13+ (0.04)
0.088
Task Programmability 0.10 (0.05)
0.207
0.12 (0.05)
0.119
0.12 (0.05)
0.106
Strategy 0.09 (0.06)
0.152
0.05 (0.06)
0.407
0.04 (0.06)
0.550
Tenure – 0.14+ (0.00)
0.058
0.16* (0.00)
0.032
Founder – –0.01 (0.21)
0.920
–0.01 (0.21)
0.857
Owner – –0.04 (0.17)
0.592
–0.63+ (0.75)
0.059
Education – 0.02 (0.14)
0.810
0.66* (0.72)
0.047
iLOC – 0.17** (0.08)
0.008
0.13 (0.15)
0.239
iLOC*Owner – – 0.61+ (0.17)
0.073
iLOC*Education – – –0.67* (0.17)
0.048
F-value 2.926**0.009 2.583**0.004 2.695**0.001 3.065*0.049
R2 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.02
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.01
n = 247, β coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-value estimates in italics
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, two-tailed tests
qualitative, non-task-related performance dimensions such as loyalty, commitment,
and quality of work-results with the purpose of influencing subordinate behavior
(subjective performance evaluations, see e. g. Bol 2008; Gibbs et al. 2004; Grabner
2014; Grabner and Speckbacher 2016; Moers 2005).
Besides providing evidence for the association of the CEO’s iLOC with the use
of subjective performance evaluations, we analyze the direct and indirect role of two
observable CEO characteristics, CEO ownership and CEO education, in explaining
performance evaluations in small and medium-sized firms. Both CEO characteristics
have been analyzed in previous literature. In line with previous literature on small
and medium-sized firms and building on upper echelons arguments, we interpret
CEO ownership as a measure for the CEO’s discretion (“latitude of action”) and
CEO education as a measure for the CEO’s professionalism (the extent to which
the CEO is aware of and prepared to apply common practices and professional
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methods). In line with this interpretation (and in line with theoretical views and
empirical results in previous literature on small and medium-sized firms), we find
a direct effect of CEO ownership (negative) and CEO education (positive) on the
use of objective performance evaluations.
In contrast to OPE, we do not interpret SPE as a commonly used practice that
indicates high professionalism. Moreover, subjective performance measures are of
very limited use for non-owner CEOs to justify their actions towards owners. There-
fore, we do neither propose a negative effect of CEO ownership (interpreted as CEO
discretion) on the use of SPE nor do we expect a positive effect of CEO education
(interpreted as CEO awareness of common practices) on their use.
Rather, we argue (and provide evidence) for a moderating role of these two
observable CEO characteristics on the relationship between iLOC and SPE. Our
theoretical argument here again builds on the interpretation of CEO ownership as
a measure of CEO discretion and we argue that higher discretion gives personality
more room, whereas CEO education is interpreted as a “constraining” mechanism
which attenuates the influence of psychological characteristics on strategic admin-
istrative decisions in general (and the use of SPE in particular).
Thus, we propose (and provide evidence) that firms with CEOs who are also
owners of their companies make lower use of OPE while such firms make relatively
high use of SPE when their CEO has a high iLOC. Firms with CEOs with a higher
level of education make higher use of OPE while the level of SPE use is relatively
unaffected by their CEO’s iLOC.
Overall, our research underlines the importance of chief executive personality in
relatively small firms and it is a first step towards “CEO psychological characteris-
tics”-based explanations of the particularities of administrative choices in relatively
small firms.
The empirical evidence we provide in this paper is subject to a number of lim-
itations and more comprehensive empirical testing of the the possible impact of
CEO psychological characteristics on the use of management control mechanisms
seems a fruitful avenue for future research. As indicated by the existing literature
from psychology and management/accounting (see our above discussion of previous
literature), such characteristics should include CEO narcissism, CEO conscientious-
ness and CEO agreeableness. Moreover, a theoretical and empirical analysis of
the joint impact of different aspects of personality and organizational contingen-
cies seems a promising task. In particular, our extensive pretest led us to simplify
several constructs of organizational contingencies in an attempt to increase the like-
lihood of a satisfactory response rate. It is not clear how robust our results on the
influence of iLOC on the use of SPE are when employing more comprehensive
measures for various organizational contingencies and how psychological charac-
teristics might interact with organizational contingencies in explaining the use of
performance evaluations.
Our argument in H1a and H2b is about the CEO having ownership rights or the
CEO being a “professional outside manager” without any ownership rights. There-
fore, we asked CEOs whether they possess ownership rights or not. However, we
do not measure the degree to which the CEO possesses ownership rights which is
again a limitation of our study. Another concern relates to our measure of CEO edu-
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cation. As noted by Hambrick and Mason (1984), education is a crude and muddied
measure that includes various aspects related to cognitive style, motivation, socioe-
conomic background and various other aspects of personality. Clearly, our measure
of CEO education (which simply measures if the CEO has a University degree) is
extremely crude and cleaner measures of the included aspects of CEO background
would be desirable. Moreover, even in small firms, the use of performance evalua-
tions for middle managers is not always made autonomously by the CEO and thus it
might be desirable to include also the influence of other top managers (and of their
personality characteristics).
In line with great parts of previous contingency research, we model objective
and subjective performance evaluation as distinct choices (our empirical analysis
uses two different models with OPE/SPE as dependent variables), although these
choices may be interrelated as substitutes or complements (and, of course, they may
also be related to other control choices). Clearly, a more comprehensive analysis of
the influence of executives’ personality on choices on control packages would be
desirable.
Finally, a quite fundamental issue in cross-sectional upper echelons research is
the inability to picture clear cause and effect relationships. Most likely, certain types
of firms attract certain types of CEOs and organizational design variables may thus
not be the result of CEO personal characteristics but these personal characteristics
may rather be implied by organizations hiring CEOs that fit the organization.
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Appendix
SPE – Subjective Performance Evaluation
Middle managers are evaluated based on my assessment of ... (1 does not apply,
7 applies fully).
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Item Factor loadings
... the quality of their work results 0.699
... their work motivation and commitment 0.852
... their ability to work in teams 0.826
... their ability to effectively acquire new skills (learning ability) 0.774
... their long-term perspective on the business objectives 0.792
... their loyalty towards the company 0.829
... their identification with the goals and values of the company 0.801
(Cronbach Alpha:0.900)
OPE – Objective Performance Evaluation
Middle managers are evaluated based on ... (1 does not apply, 7 applies fully).
Item Factor loadings
... the achievement of ex ante determined objectives (e. g. revenues, profit) 0.893
... financial performance measures 0.897
... non-financial performance measures (i. e. customer satisfaction, reject
rate)
0.531
(Cronbach Alpha:0.685)
iLOC – Internal Locus of Control
To what extent do you personally agree with the following statements? (1 disagree,
7 totally agree).
Item Factor loadings
It is mainly dependent on me and my competences whether or not I possess
a leading position within a group
0.661
When I make plans I am sure that my plans become reality 0.717
I am able to determine a lot of what happens in my life by myself 0.763
Normally I can represent all my interests by myself 0.588
Whether or not I have a car accident depends mainly on my driving talent 0.492
(Cronbach Alpha: 0.625)
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Strategic Orientation
We intent mainly to be better than our competitors by ... (1 does not apply, 7 applies
fully).
Item Factor loadings
... achieving lower cost 0.747
... making services/procedures more cost efficient 0.841
... improving the utilization of available equipment and facilities 0.866
(Cronbach Alpha: 0.727)
Outcome Measurability, Task Programmability
To what extent do the following statements describe your organization?
Item Factor loadings
It is difficult to measure the performance of middle managers with perfor-
mance indicators
–
It is difficult to assess which actions middle managers have to take to
achieve certain results
–
Environmental Uncertainty
How do you assess the predictability of changes in the following areas? (1 not
predictable, 7 very well predictable).
Item Factor loadings
Behavior and buying patterns of customers 0.725
Behavior/strategies of competitors 0.741
Technological developments in your company’s primary industry 0.788
Behavior/strategies of your suppliers 0.762
(Cronbach Alpha: 0.747)
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